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ABSTRACT
Small-scale spatially complex fisheries resources present a particular challenge 
to centralized governmental top-down models of assessment and management. 
Such processes have an implicit scale and cost that cannot be simply resized to 
address the complexity, small scale, low unit value, and overwhelming number of 
these resources. International experience with alternative management systems 
has produced convergence on a solution to this issue, which involves redesigning 
the centralized top-down models of data collection, assessment, and management. 
Central to the solution are governance systems that confer secure exclusive access 
rights on fishers, so that they have strong incentives to engage in processes of data 
collection, assessment, and management. I suggest that the next layer of the solution 
is to recognize the generic nature of the issue and to develop a simpler generic 
approach that can be locally adapted to each small-scale resource. The generic 
approach proposed involves (1) the use of barefoot ecologists or change agents 
trained to work with both the social and biological dimensions of each resource 
with the aim of creating social capital and empowering local fishers to collect their 
own data and (2) the design and implementation of simple harvest policies intended 
to conserve local levels of spawning biomass.
The misfit of both temporal and spatial scales between ecosystems and institutions 
has come to be recognized as central to the problem of assessing and managing ma-
rine and terrestrial renewable resources (Lee, 1993; Hilborn et al., 2005; Orensanz et 
al., 2005; Wilson, 2006; Folke et al., 2007). Hilborn et al. (2005) suggested that one 
of the three primary causes for failure in fisheries is the mismatch between the spa-
tial scale of fished populations and the scale of their assessment and management. 
My focus here is a portion of this broader issue: the assessment and management of 
small-scale spatially complex fish stocks that centralized forms of management seem 
particularly unsuited to sustaining (Prince et al., 1998; Berkes et al., 2001; Johannes, 
2003; Hilborn et al., 2005; Orensanz et al., 2005; Prince, 2005; Wilson, 2006).
The problems created when fish range across national political borders are obvi-
ous, but much less attention has been paid to mismatches that disguise the fine-scale 
structure of fish stocks (Wilson, 2006). Although fisheries texts have long recom-
mended analyzing fishery data at the finest possible scale (e.g., Gulland, 1969), such 
resources are usually assessed and managed as though they were panmictic, dispers-
ing freely throughout their ranges (Wilson, 2006). Awareness is growing that many 
species have complex stock structures (Johannes, 1978, 1981a; Stephenson, 1999; 
Hilborn et al., 2005) forming metapopulations (Shepherd and Brown, 1993; Wilson, 
2006) composed of many small populations or “microstocks” (Prince, 2005) that can 
be relatively isolated from each other or connected by complex flows of larvae and/or 
juveniles and adults (Orensanz et al., 2005; Almanny et al., 2007; Temby et al., 2007). 
Orensanz et al. (2005) term these fisheries “S-fisheries” after the common first letter 
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of many of the adjectives used to describe them (e.g., small scale, spatially structured, 
sedentary stocks).
Prince et al. (1998) and Prince (2005) used the Australian abalone (haliotid) fish-
ery as a case study to illustrate why the small scale (10s–100s of meters) of larval, 
juvenile, and adult movement combined with the variable size of maturity make oth-
erwise effective broad-scale management, with size limits, limited entry, and indi-
vidual transferable quotas, ineffective and led to serial depletion and the erosion of 
spatial structure in the stock: at the scale of component populations or microstocks 
(100s to 1000s of meters) de facto open access continued (Wilson, 2006). The “race 
to fish” therefore continued within these resources despite broad-scale management 
limiting fishing mortality at the level of the metapopulation (Wilson, 2006). Term-
ing this problem the “tragedy of scale,” Prince et al. (1998) argued along with oth-
ers (Berkes et al., 2001; Wilson, 2006) that the problem cannot be solved by simple 
rescaling of centralized top-down models of assessment and management, because 
of their implicit broad scale, the sheer number of “units of stock,” and the associated 
transactional costs (Fig. 1).
The questions I address here are, first, if the existing orthodox models of central-
ized and top-down fisheries assessment and management are inadequate for small 
spatially complex fisheries (Wilson, 2006), what model of assessment and manage-
ment could be successfully applied and, second, if governments can be persuaded to 
set up governance frameworks that will foster stewardship of small-scale spatially 
complex fisheries, how will we meet the massive technical challenge of managing 
a myriad of microstocks? Here, I propose that the keys to this seemingly daunting 
situation are to recognize the generic nature of the problem and to develop and apply 
knowledge, techniques, skills, and tools that are also generic. I propose that, rather 
than uniquely developing specific approaches to each small-scale fishery, we should 
be replicating and locally adapting a generic approach involving education, commu-
nity empowerment and facilitation, and fisher-based programs of data collection, 
assessment, and local management intended to maintain conservative levels of local 
spawning biomass.
In forming this opinion I have been influenced by both my own experience and the 
literature describing the challenges and relative successes experienced with these 
types of fisheries under alternatives to the centralized top-down management mod-
els most of us are familiar with. Only a cursory overview of the literature that I am 
most familiar with is provided here to provide context; readers wishing to examine 
this topic in depth are referred to the excellent book on this topic by Berkes et al. 
(2001).
Johannes (1978, 1981a,b, 1984, 2002) and others (Ruddle et al., 1992; Hickey, 2007) 
have documented, in the context of the small-scale marine resources of Oceania, 
the ways in which systems of customary marine tenure, which conferred exclu-
sive access rights to local fishing grounds on fishing communities, often fostered 
the development of traditional systems of sustainable management and the ways in 
which, more recently, recovery and strengthening of these traditional systems have 
improved management, partially repairing the erosion that resulted from introduc-
tion of centralized government, new fishing technologies, and access to cash markets 
(Johannes, 1998a, 2002; Ruddle, 2007). Customary marine tenure and other prac-
tices that protected marine resources were also common across much of Southeast 
Asia and Africa before being eroded by similar influences (Johannes, 1981b; Satria, 
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2007). In 1994, to counter these trends, the International Center for Living Aquatic 
Resources Management and the Institute of Fisheries Management, with national 
partners in Asia and Africa, initiated the Fisheries Co-management Research Proj-
ect, with the aim of developing strategies and processes for use and adoption by gov-
ernments, fishing communities, and nongovernmental organizations (Pomeroy et 
al., 2001). Pomeroy et al. (2001) and Macfadyen et al. (2005) provided analyses of the 
results of this study and discussed the elements of the individual case studies that 
have contributed to both success and failure. Both produced a list of prescriptions 
they found successful in fostering self-management (Table 1). Berkes et al. (2001) also 
make reference to that body of experience and list the same prescriptions.
Yamamoto (1995), Uchida and Wilen (2004), and Makino and Matsuda (2005) de-
scribe the decentralized and, in some respects, innovative Japanese system of fishing 
cooperative associations (FCAs). The Japanese system has its antecedents in 17th-
century traditions, but only in 1948 was it fully recognized under law. The FCAs are 
responsible for managing access to all the coastal fishery resources within their local 
jurisdictions, including both sedentary shellfish resources such as clams and mus-
sels, sea urchins and abalone, and shrimp and more mobile species like flatfish, rock-
fish, mackerel, herring, and pollock. Some 85% (almost 250,000) of Japanese fishers 
are members of FCAs, and they handle 34% of the Japanese total seafood production 
by weight, almost 50% by value. Within the locality-based FCAs, members of specific 
fisheries spontaneously organize themselves into fishery-management organizations 
on a needs basis, in order to focus on issues confronting their fishery. Although not 
officially counted until 1988, these organizations have steadily grown in number 
from around 30 in 1948, when the system came into law, to around 500 in 1962, 1339 
in 1988, and 1743 in 1998 (Yamamoto, 1995; Uchida and Wilen, 2004).
Figure 1. Schematic of the tyranny of scale confronting small-scale spatially complex fisheries 
under top-down centralized models of assessment and management. Reproduced with permission 
from Prince (2003a).
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Table 1. Convergent solutions for managing small, spatially complex fisheries. Synthesized by the 
author from previous studies in several different parts of the world.
Oceania (Johannes 1984, 1994, 1998b)
Exclusive access rights; customary marine tenure; territorial use rights (TURFs)
Extension workers trained to collect and use fisher knowledge and to facilitate development of 
local management strategies by villages
Dataless management: local fisher knowledge and generalized expert knowledge combined to 
develop simple management strategies for conserving local levels of spawning biomass
Japan (Yamamoto, 1995; Uchida and Wilen, 2004; Makino and Matsuda, 2005)
Local fishing rights recognized by law; TURFs
Local fishers identifying management issues and addressing them through species- or gear-
focused groups
Governmental structures that harmonize management strategies of local and regional scales
Local extension scientists
Southeast Asia (Pomeroy et al., 2001)
Supracommunity level
Enabling policy and legislation
External change agents
Community level
Appropriately scaled and defined boundaries
Clearly defined membership
Group homogeneity
Participation by those affected
Leadership
Empowerment, capacity building, and social preparation
Community organizations
Long-term local government support
Property rights
Adequate financial resources
Partnerships and partner sense of ownership of process
Accountability
Conflict-management mechanisms
Clear objectives and defined issues
Enforcement of management rules
Individual and household level
Individual incentive structure
Southeast Asia and Oceania (Macfadyen et al., 2005)
User rights that provide strong incentives for stakeholders to engage
Recognized local communities of stakeholders
Leadership and strengthening of community-based institutions to engage with comanagement.
Local political support.
Formal legislative backing that codifies and helps to enforce community rules and to resolve 
disputes
Chile (Orensanz et al., 2005)
Systems that provide the right incentives
Promotion of participation by fishers and other stakeholders
Spatially explicit and experimental management
Broader definition of data; recognition of the greater utility of spatially explicit qualitative data 
than of inexplicit quantitative data
Requirement of spatially explicit data for participation by fishers
Use of simple feedback decision rules driven by data (as opposed to mediated by assessment 
models) to adjust harvest regulations in response to monitoring indices
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In contrast to those listed above, the Chilean “caleta” system described by Castilla 
et al. (1998), Orensanz et al. (2005), and Gonzalez et al. (2006) is a recently con-
structed initiative, established by law in 1992, for artisanal fisheries. Under it, local 
organizations of fishers are entitled to claim exclusive access rights to the fishing 
grounds used by their community and are required to gather data and administer 
management arrangements. In each caleta, fishers harvest a range of some 50 spe-
cies; diving for bivalves, gastropods, cephalopods, urchins, and kelp; trapping crabs; 
and setting baited hooks for hake and pink ling. Although not without weaknesses 
(Gonzalez et al., 2006; W. Stotz, Universidad Católica del Norte, Coquimbo, Chile, 
pers. comm.) the caleta system has grown rapidly since implementation began in 
1997. More than 250 caletas have formed and successfully established their rights to 
approximately 36% of the coastline that has historically accounted for about 82% of 
historic landings, and analyses by Gonzalez et al. (2006) suggest the system is largely 
succeeding in rebuilding stocks of the most valuable species (loco, Concholepas con-
cholepas Bruguière) within the managed areas. On the basis of their collective Latin 
American experience, Orensanz et al. (2005) provide a six-point prescription for suc-
cessfully managing S-fisheries (Table 1).
The above is by no means an exhaustive review of the literature on the case stud-
ies mentioned, let alone of the broader body of observational and theoretical work 
that draws on parallel experience from many other parts of the world. Nevertheless 
any synthesis of this international experience reveals a strong convergence in think-
ing about the factors that contribute to the successful assessment and management 
of fine-scale spatially complex marine resources (Table 1). Here, I attempt first to 
identify these common elements and then to draw them together into an alternative 
model of assessment and management. I then present a case study illustrating how 
these principles are currently being applied in the Australian abalone fishery.
Managing Fine-Scale Spatially Complex Fisheries
Resource Users as the Essential Part of the Process.—The spatial com-
plexity and low unit value of these types of resources preclude central-government-
dominated processes of data collection, assessment, and management because of 
cost and scarcity of government resources (Berkes et al., 2001; Prince, 2003a). Fishers 
must be engaged and take ownership of the entire process of monitoring, assessing, 
and managing their resources (Berkes et al., 2001; Prince 2003a); they must become 
more than just harvesters, data providers, or sources of oral information. As con-
cluded by Gonzalez et al. (2006: 522), “In order to become effective stewards, fishers 
must participate in the identification of the problems, design and conduct surveys 
and experiments, gather the information, and understand the results.” Clearly only 
strong incentives will induce the fishermen to accept these responsibilities.
Governance and Management Systems: Exclusive Access Rights.—The 
incentive to take on the responsibility of stewardship is created by governance 
frameworks that create exclusive access rights for fishermen (Johannes, 1982, 1984; 
Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999; Berkes et al., 2001; Charles, 2001; Dietz et al., 
2003; Hilborn et al., 2004; Orensanz et al., 2005). This is a robust and symmetrical 
principle of fisheries management. Johannes (1982: 259) concluded, “It would be dif-
ficult to overemphasize the importance of some form of limited entry…to sound fish-
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eries management.” Macfadyen et al. (2005) found marked differences in the success 
of resource management between countries where exclusive access rights exist and 
those where they do not. Summarizing the body of empirical experience from differ-
ing angles, Jentoft (2000) argued that communities that disintegrate are a threat to 
fish stocks, whereas Hilborn et al. (2004) proposed that sustainable fishing will occur 
whenever institutional frameworks encourage participants to behave in a way that 
is considered optimal for society. Recently Costello et al. (2008) tested this premise 
quantitatively with a metaanalysis of fisheries managed with individual transferable 
quotas (ITQs), finding that implementation of catch shares halts, and even rever-
ses, the global trend toward widespread collapse. They concluded that institutional 
change has the potential for greatly altering the future of global fisheries (Costello et 
al., 2008). The challenge of devising effective governance systems is therefore a fun-
damental and primary part of the solution to managing fisheries in general (Dietz et 
al., 2003), and spatially complex fisheries in particular (Hilborn et al., 2004, 2005), 
which Dietz et al. (2003) likened to a coevolutionary race.
But does the exact form of exclusive access right matter for spatially complex 
fisheries? Costello et al. (2008) might be read superficially as suggesting that 
management with ITQs is the preferred form of access right in all situations, but 
they note that for ease of analysis they restricted themselves to the one narrow class 
of access rights and stressed, along with others (e.g., Berkes et al., 2001; Hilborn 
et al., 2005), the need to match institutional reform appropriately with ecological, 
economic, and social characteristics so that the form of property rights implemented 
in each fishery can achieve maximal benefits. Ostrom et al. (1999) observed that the 
empirical evidence across all forms of common-pool resources shows that no single 
type of property regime works efficiently, fairly, and sustainably in relation to all 
resources. Focusing on spatially complex fisheries, Prince et al. (1998), Prince (2003a), 
and Orensanz et al. (2005) all advocated using territorial use rights (TURFs; Christy, 
1982) arguing that the spatially explicit nature of TURF management is particularly 
suited to fostering stewardship of small-scale spatially complex species. Yamamoto 
(1995) concluded that the nature of Japanese territorial fishing rights is what has 
lead fishermen to engage in community-based management. Similarly Johannes, 
in his body of work, accepts a priori that the customary-marine-tenure systems of 
Oceania and Southeast Asia, based on exclusive territorial rights, are the best suited 
for managing artisanal fisheries on spatially complex tropical species. Thus TURFs 
seem to offer the outline of a system that has been observed to work successfully for 
spatially complex fisheries throughout Oceania, Asia, and South America, wherever 
governance provides a stable form of exclusive access right.
Clearly the provision of secure exclusive access rights requires the active support 
of various tiers of government in enacting enabling policy and legislation and in 
defining appropriate scales (Pomeroy et al., 2001; Wilson, 2006; Folke et al., 2007), 
but even if governments can be persuaded to enact the reforms needed, the massive 
technical challenge of managing a myriad of microstocks remains (Prince, 2003a). 
Common sense and self-interest can be expected to achieve a great deal within com-
munities of fishers, but in most situations some basic level of fisheries expertise will 
also be needed. Unfortunately the technical challenge of managing, monitoring, and 
assessing these resources is proportional to the number of functional units of stock 
rather than to their size or value (Larkin, 1997; Prince et al., 1998; Berkes et al., 2001; 
Prince, 2003a; Wilson, 2006). Who is going to do all that local adaptation, facilita-
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tion, and basic fisheries science? Certainly not small cash-strapped centralized gov-
ernments or the universities they fund (Fig. 1). Most countries simply have too many 
small-scale resources to assess and manage individually and not enough taxpayers to 
pay for it all (Berkes et al., 2001; Prince, 2003a, 2005; Wilson, 2006).
A Generic Approach. —The key to this seemingly daunting situation is to rec-
ognize that fundamentally the knowledge, techniques, skills, and tools needed are 
generic. In a very real sense all marine resources are similar. The tyranny of scale is 
universal; only the quantitative parameter values vary, like the rate of reproduction 
(h), natural mortality rate (M), and the absolute spatial scale of normal dispersion 
over a life cycle. Assessing and managing spatially complex stocks can therefore be 
considered a generic issue within any governmental framework designed to foster 
local management. Rather than uniquely developing specific approaches to each 
small-scale fishery, we should consider a process of efficiently replicating the same 
process of local adaption to each new local resource and of the repeated use of similar 
systems of education, facilitation, data collection, mapping, analysis, assessment, and 
local management.
So what are the key elements of this generic approach to spatially complex marine 
resources? Drawn from the collective experience cited above, the generic ingredients 
are agents of change or extension officers supported with a generic software toolbox, 
the collection and use of fisher knowledge, collaboration with fishers to collect size 
and abundance data, a broader definition of data and knowledge, clear management 
objectives, and simple decision rules aimed at conserving local levels of spawning 
biomass.
Barefoot Ecologists or Change Agents.—Johannes (1984, 1994) wrote that 
extension workers are needed to support change and that they should be trained to 
obtain the information needed to plan and sustain village management strategies 
on the basis of the practical aspects of local knowledge. Pomeroy et al. (2001) and 
Berkes et al. (2001) described the importance of a similar role, for workers they called 
“external change agents,” who provide information to fishing communities, facilitate 
community dialogue about the management of local resources, and catalyze change. 
In the Japanese system, the extension role is less one of catalyzing change and is 
more concerned with supporting ongoing processes. Local extension scientists 
play a liaison role between the fishing communities and government agencies, 
helping to provide the linkage between local and regional scales of management 
and coordinating local scientific programs that inform the setting of total allowable 
catch and monitoring of stock trends (Yamamoto, 1995; Uchida and Wilen, 2004). 
Likewise in Chile the TURF system’s scientific consultants play an important role, 
monitoring resource health and stock status for each TURF and reporting the results 
on behalf of the caletas to the federal regulators who approve local management 
plans on that basis or modify regulations where necessary (Gonzalez et al., 2006). 
Although Gonzalez et al. (2006) observed that Chilean artisanal fishers need to be 
more active in the decision process and less subservient to consultants and that, for 
these changes to be possible, fishers must understand the dynamics of their resources 
and be able to engage in dialogue with consultants and managers (rather than simply 
being handymen for them).
Berkes et al. (2001) noted that small-scale fisheries need a new set of skills and 
capabilities, people who can work on the interface among science, industry, and 
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management. They envisage this role as being filled by a mediator/synthesizer, an 
objective and knowledgeable third party who can cope with inputs from both sci-
entific/technical and industry stakeholders. Noting the generic and basic nature of 
the skill set needed for this role, along with the considerable breadth of interest and 
talents required to span community facilitation, fisher lore, survey design, assess-
ment, and management, Prince (2003a,b) termed this role the “barefoot ecologist,” 
after the Chinese “barefoot doctor” programs that did so much to raise the standard 
of community health in China during the 1950s, suggesting that, as with the Chinese 
barefoot doctor program, barefoot ecologists should where possible be drawn from 
the fishing communities to which they would return to work. The essence of this role 
should be to act as a change agent building human capacity (Berkes et al., 2001) and 
social capital (Dietz et al., 2003), empowering fishing communities to monitor and 
manage themselves (Berkes et al., 2001; Prince, 2003a,b). In relation to the current 
role of outside experts in the Chilean caleta system, Gonzalez et al. (2006) suggested 
revamping the system to provide incentives so that new forms of technical/scien-
tific assistance are developed that more closely approximate the concept of barefoot 
ecologists.
The Use of Fisher Knowledge.—The barefoot ecologist will inevitably have a 
pressing need for information (Berkes et al., 2001; Prince, 2003a) about the basic 
distributional and life-history data needed for initial parameterization of assessment 
models, the ongoing time series data needed to monitor trends, and the social fea-
tures in the community that will determine how management evolves. Some of the 
most important techniques in the barefoot ecologist’s toolbox will therefore pertain 
to the gathering of information.
In any local situation the major repository of information is the fishers themselves, 
and the use of fisher knowledge is perhaps the most important tool of the barefoot 
ecologist (Johannes, 1982; Berkes et al., 2001; Prince 2003a). Like the fish themselves, 
however, such information is never distributed randomly through the fishing com-
munity, so random sampling followed by rigorous statistical analysis of data can 
yield highly variable and misleading results (Neis et al., 1999; Johannes and Yeeting, 
2000); 80% of the fish are generally caught by 20% of the fishers and not without 
reason. Not all fishers are valuable sources of information; the best are also often the 
most knowledgeable, and seeking out those who enjoy a high reputation among their 
own people is worthwhile (Johannes, 1981b). Johannes recommended finding people 
of high reputation and keeping the interviews flexible (“deliberately unstructured”) 
so that informants themselves can bring up topics they consider important rather 
than just being channeled to what the researcher thinks will be important (Johannes 
and Yeeting, 2000). Neis et al. (1999) calls this approach of using interviews to iden-
tify the local experts “snowball sampling,” because the referral process “generates 
an ever-increasing set” of interviewees. In the way Johannes (1981a) practiced the 
approach, however, it is probably better referred to as the “kernel” approach, whereby 
many of the interviews serve only to identify those the fishing community regards as 
the local experts, and these few remarkable individuals then form the kernel of the 
process from which most of the information is gained.
From my own experience, a key point to be remembered in collecting and using 
fisher knowledge is to distinguish clearly between what has been observed and the 
inferences drawn from those observations. The best fishers are invariably powerful 
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observers and very successfully use the patterns of behavior they observe to predict 
where, when, and how to fish, and this ability can invariably be trusted. In contrast, 
the mechanism inferred as having given rise to the observation can often be flawed. 
Johannes and Neis (2007) provided a nice example, describing how fishers in Belize 
told Johannes and other researchers where whale sharks (Rhincodon typus Smith) 
were spawning. When they went to investigate these claims they were able to docu-
ment for the first time whale sharks feeding on clouds of spawn produced by large ag-
gregations of snapper (Heyman et al., 2001). Until that time scientists had not known 
that whale sharks could feed on such small particulate foods. The key point is always 
to test what informants say. For this purpose Johannes (1981b) recommended asking 
some questions to which the interviewer is already confident of the answer and using 
the response to test the reliability of the informant.
Fishing for Knowledge.—Fisher knowledge is particularly useful for learning 
about behavior and biology, mapping out distributions over space and time, describ-
ing stock structures, and describing broad changes in catch and catch rate and in 
species and size composition trends over time and space. On the other hand, any 
barefoot ecologist wishing to assess the status of a local resource is likely to want to 
establish some means of gathering more quantitative time-series data as a means of 
monitoring abundance over time in order to work toward at least a semiquantitative 
assessment to support future management decisions. Again local fishing communi-
ties should be considered essential to achieving such aims.
Many fishermen gather their own data in order to study patterns they observe 
and will readily engage with formal monitoring systems if they take ownership of 
those systems. Two of the dividends from secure property rights are that, having 
been saved from the “race to fish,” fishermen have both the incentive to participate 
in data collection and a level of “spare” vessel and personal time that in the right 
setting can be direct toward data gathering. Working with motivated fishermen to 
understand the fishing techniques they employ can often reveal ways in which, for 
few additional resources, valuable long-term spatially explicit indices of abundance 
can be gathered. In particular, if fishermen will take the trouble to measure at least a 
few individual animals on each fishing trip and undertake to provide positional and 
supplemental data, sophisticated size-based indices of abundance can be developed 
for little additional work and minimal expenditure.
Two examples illustrate what is possible. In the case of the southern shark fishery 
in southern Australia, 80% of the gill-net fishing occurs in about 18% of the available 
fishing grounds. The fishers suggested that they could measure every fish and shark 
caught in the first shot of each trip, generally a low-catch-rate shot placed fairly blind-
ly into a known productive ground. The fisher observes the catch composition of the 
first shot and decides where to move the net so that the catch composition might be 
optimized during the rest of the fishing trip. For the cost of about AUD$30,000, this 
program can gather data that cost approximately AUD$500,000 to gather through 
government research surveys. In the case of the South Australian lobster fishery de-
scribed by Walters et al. (1998), fishermen started by voluntarily agreeing to tag one 
pot in their 40- to 80-pot allocation and measuring all the lobsters in that pot each 
day. Later, the fisheries agency temporarily allowed the fishermen participating in 
research to fish with an extra pot above their legal pot allocation on the condition 
that they tagged and released all the lobsters caught in that extra pot. This low-cost 
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project allowed development of spatially explicit indices of abundance based on size-
structured catch rates and revealed regional differences in movement, growth, and 
exploitation rates.
Dataless Management and a Broader Definition of Data.—Undoubtedly 
in some fisheries the prospect for gathering even limited quantitative data will be al-
ways be elusive. In such truly dataless fisheries, the types of techniques that Johannes 
(1998b) called “dataless” must be developed and applied. As Johannes pointed out, 
managing without data does not mean managing without knowledge, as even in the 
remotest unresearched areas, the information baseline is by no means zero. Sim-
ilarly Orensanz et al. (2005) recommended broadening our definition of data and 
noted that a broad base of spatially explicit qualitative data can often be more useful 
than a few precise but spatially inexplicit quantitative data. Even when no quantita-
tive data exist, combining the knowledge of fishers with the generalized knowledge 
of fisheries experts can result in powerful “rules of thumb” and “rapid appraisal” 
techniques through which diagnoses can be made, allowing management to pro-
ceed through a common-sense approach (Johannes, 1998b; Berkes et al., 2001). Most 
marine-resource experts (scientists and fishers) have learned how to make rapid vi-
sual assessment of catches and situations (Berkes et al., 2001). For example, in coral 
reef management, a green reef flat indicates that algae are overgrowing the corals, 
suggesting that reef gleaning is depleting populations of grazing invertebrates. In a 
fishery where adults and juveniles can be recognized visually through size, color, or 
morphology, catches or populations composed almost entirely of juveniles indicate a 
risk of growth and recruitment overfishing.
Simple Decision Rules and Clear Management Objectives.—Moving away 
from complete reliance on quantitative data toward using qualitative information 
does obviously force changes in the approach to assessment and management. A 
broad realization is growing that, while the problem of overfishing intensifies (Mul-
lon et al., 2005), many of the sophisticated approaches being developed to address 
overfishing, including harvest policies and quota systems, are being designed to re-
quire scientific knowledge, data, and model structures beyond the capability of most 
fisheries (Walters and Pearse, 1996; Cochrane, 1999). In dealing with paucity of data 
and the spatial complexity that often exacerbates it, the need arises to reevaluate the 
overreliance on complex, data-intensive stock-assessment models. In their six-point 
solution for S-fisheries (Table 1) Orensanz et al. (2005) include the “use of simple 
feedback decision rules driven by data, as opposed to mediated by assessment mod-
els, to adjust harvest regulations in response to monitoring indices.” Echoing the call 
of Ostrom (2007) to develop diagnostic approaches, we must develop simpler proce-
dures based on simple indicators collected directly from the catch.
Conserving Local Levels of Spawning Biomass.—Fisheries management 
can have many objectives and be gauged against many reference points (Berkes et 
al., 2001), but Johannes (1998b) suggests that the simple objective of dataless man-
agement should be conserving precautionary levels of spawning biomass. My own 
experience leads me to support Johannes’ suggestion strongly for a number of rea-
sons: First, the objective of conserving spawning potential is easily understood and 
naturally supported by fishers because obviously “without breeders there can be no 
young.” Second, in the case of fisheries truly without data, the objective is relatively 
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easily translated into simple management prescriptions for preserving local levels of 
spawning biomass such as banning the fishing of spawning aggregations or leaving 
abalone and trochus shells on reef tops to age (and breed) for several years before 
harvesting. Third, reducing fishing pressure so that exploited species are allowed 
several years of adult reproduction commonly produces significant gains in yield per 
recruit for a fishery and can provide rapid positive reinforcement for fishing com-
munities fostering a culture of proactive management. Fourth, where rudimentary 
forms of data exist, assessing levels of spawning-potential ratio (SPR), the ratio of 
spawning per recruit for the fished population to the spawning per recruit in an 
unfished population (Mace and Sissenwine, 1993; Walters and Martell, 2004), com-
bined with rudimentary indices of abundance, can provide a relatively simple and 
robust form of assessment and the basis for simple harvest strategies and decision 
rules (Berkes et al., 2001).
Orensanz et al. (2005) raise a valid concern about the “tragedy of the larval com-
mons,” in which upstream sources of larvae are depleted to the detriment of down-
stream sink populations. Their concern is that incentives for conserving resources 
within a TURF may be weakened by the constant replenishment of a locally overex-
ploited stock from outside sources (Orensanz et al., 2005), but this difficulty should 
be avoided by universal adoption of a strategy under which local fishers preserve 
conservative levels of spawning in all local populations. If the default assumption 
is changed to one of localized recruitment, and conservative levels of spawning 
(40%–50%) are maintained in each component population within a metapopulation, 
normal patterns of flow of individuals through the metapopulations can reasonably 
be assumed to continue, and the distinction between sources and sinks will become 
less obvious.
A Generic Software Toolbox.—Inspired by watching the way practitioners of 
Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management workshops (Holling, 1978; 
Walters, 1986) have used a software toolbox to analyze resources as diverse as the 
Florida Everglades and the Western Australian rock lobster fishery, and building on 
the idea that the technical needs of spatially complex fisheries are generic, Prince 
(2003a,b) proposed that barefoot ecologists should be armed with a generic toolbox 
in the form of a laptop computer equipped with the software they need for any situa-
tion. This suggestion has also been made by others working on this issue (e.g., Berkes 
et al., 2001).
The preceding discussion and supporting literature indicate the basic functions 
required of such software: (1) mapping, of fishing grounds, catch, effort, size, and 
patterns of SPR; (2) a database for capturing, storing, and accessing spatially explic-
it time-series data, catch, area swept, effort, size, growth, and breeding studies; (3) 
modeling and assessment routines; (4) a highly graphic user interface for visualizing 
and translating assessments, analyses, and simulations for stakeholders, managers, 
and researchers; (5) remote access to the global literature so that default parameter 
estimates are always available from similar species elsewhere in the world (Berkes et 
al., 2001).
Visualization of the results of resource modeling has tended to be neglected. 
Models with easy-to-use and understandable graphical output are rare because 
resource modelers and biologists internally visualize much of their own analysis and 
have little personal need to represent their data visually (Walters et al., 1998), but 
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where engaging the understanding and enthusiasm of local stakeholders is critical 
(Berkes et al., 2001), the power of visualization should not be ignored (Sluczanowski 
et al., 1992). Moving color pictures provide a powerful form of data compression. 
Previous applications have demonstrated that presenting population dynamics in 
interactive moving color graphics makes complicated stock assessment immediately 
intelligible (Sluczanowski, 1994; Sluczanowski and Prince, 1994; Walters et al., 1998). 
With reference to one such application Walters et al. (1998: 383) noted that fishers 
participating in the workshops “were quick to appreciate how the data they collected 
were used to develop an understanding of such complex and dynamics systems. 
The power of this type of graphical interface for communicating results was clearly 
obvious to every biologist in attendance.”
The vision is to develop the toolbox software as an open-source project and to train 
barefoot ecologists in the use of the same standard generic piece of software. Then, 
paralleling the process described by Berkes et al. (2001), each time a barefoot ecolo-
gist engages with a new marine resource, the process of developing a new adaptation 
of the software is the same: (1) Mine the international literature for what is known 
about parallel resources. (2) Find and talk to the best local fishers. (3) Use all avail-
able knowledge and proxy parameters from the global literature to fill the gaps in the 
data needed to adapt the software locally, and produce an interactive, moving color 
graphic depiction of the local resource. (4) Use the visualization to facilitate discus-
sion and learning in stakeholder workshops, cement understanding of resource pro-
cesses, and work to galvanize group action. (5) Set up information-gathering systems 
and start accumulating time-series information. (6) Discuss local management and 
develop understandable and supportable decision rules for using new information 
that becomes available through cooperative information gathering.
Each local installation of the software would stay permanently in place, belonging 
to the local fishers rather than to the barefoot ecologist. The software would contain 
maps showing their stocks and survey systems, complementary sheets for entering 
the fishery and survey data collected by the fishers, and the latest fitting of the model 
accessible as an interactive visual computer simulator. Over time, with the accumu-
lation of reliable time-series data, models of the resource could become more so-
phisticated and accurate, and simulations of future stock levels should become more 
reliable. Sluczanowski (1993) saw each local adaption of the software as becoming 
highly valued by stakeholders over time as their data accumulate and as simulations 
of catches and cash flow become more accurate. In effect the locally adapted software 
is left in place to become the ledger for the communities’ business—fish stock ac-
counts (Sluczanowski, 1993).
In this way, approaching the issue of fine-scale complex fisheries as a generic issue 
might turn the sheer magnitude of the task before us from a weakness into a strength 
(Fig. 2). The case study that follows illustrates how simple decision rules (Orensanz 
et al., 2005) or diagnostic approaches (Ostrom, 2007), can be applied to simple forms 
of spatially explicit information collected by fishers. It also illustrates how engag-
ing fishing communities in their own structured processes of local assessment can 
lead to improved management without rigorous quantitative assessments and to im-
proved collection of spatially explicit data without increased research budgets.
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A Case Study: 
The Reef Scale Assessment of Australian Abalone Stocks
The Australian abalone fisheries are managed across the jurisdictions of five sep-
arate states (New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, and Western 
Australia). Each jurisdiction supports several regional fisheries, known as zones, 
each of which comprises several hundred kilometers of coastline. Across states and 
zones, management regulations have evolved along parallel paths over four decades, 
as described by Prince and Shepherd (1992). Generally, 15–40 divers share access to 
several hundred kilometers of coastline in filling their ITQs while observing some 
zonal legal minimum length regulations. Under the existing Victorian Abalone Fish-
ery Management Plan (Fisheries Victoria, 2002), fisheries assessments are conducted 
annually by an Abalone Fishery Assessment Group. This group includes participants 
from all major stakeholder entities. A keystone of the regional assessment process is 
the prescribed use of a quantitative fisheries model of each zone to estimate the risk 
of reducing abalone biomass below zone-specific reference values corresponding to 
alternate levels of harvest (Gorfine et al., 2001). The Abalone Fisheries Committee, a 
subcommittee of the Fisheries Co-management Council, is charged with using these 
results from formal Abalone Fishery Assessment Group workshops to formulate in-
dependent advice about future zonal total allowable commercial catches (TACCs) 
that is communicated through the comanagement council to the Minister for Pri-
mary Industries (Fisheries Victoria, 2002). Ultimately, the minister uses this advice 
in determining the annual TACC for each zone.
The ecology of abalone has important implications for their assessment and man-
agement (Prince, 2004, 2005). The small scale of the self-recruiting populations and 
the differences among populations of size at maturity make assessment and man-
agement extremely complex. Zonal minimum lengths and TACCs fail to protect 
component populations with relatively larger sizes at maturity, so these populations 
may experience localized recruitment overfishing. Conversely, nearby abalone pop-
Figure 2. Schematic of the suggested solution to the problems of assessing and managing small-
scale spatially complex fisheries. Reproduced from Prince (2003a).
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ulations with relatively smaller sizes at maturity might remain virtually unfished. 
The need for more spatially explicit assessment and management of abalone fisheries 
was identified more than a decade ago (Prince and Shepherd, 1992; McShane, 1995; 
Prince et al., 1998), but attempts to model the fishery at reef scales have been im-
peded by the lack of sufficient detailed spatial data.
Since 2001, an industry initiative has been developing an alternative approach to 
assessing and managing this spatially complex fishery that uses principles of rapid 
visual assessment (RVA), decision rules, and harvest policies (Prince et al., 2008). The 
approach is novel in its use of qualitative morphometric markers (shell shape and 
appearance) to gauge fishing pressure at the scale of abalone reefs and because the 
local industry associations assess component populations and form and implement 
prescribed reef-scale harvest policies. Harvest policies are being implemented with 
reef-scale voluntary minimum length limits and voluntary capping of catches from 
reef-scale areas so as to distribute the TACC set by government regulation for broad 
regions of the fishery. In a reversal of the normal “top-down” approach to manage-
ment, this process of reef assessment by industry is increasingly being used to inform 
the fisheries agency of the state government during the process of setting regional 
TACCs.
Central to the RVA technique is the proposition that the relative maturity of aba-
lone can be gauged visually by the shape and appearance of their shells. The use of 
shape and appearance in fisheries assessment and management is not entirely novel. 
Morphometrics are used to distinguish between finfish stocks (Begg et al., 1999; 
Swain and Foote, 1999; Cadrin and Silva, 2005), and Hickey (2007) records that vil-
lagers in Vanuatu place taboos on picking turbo shells (Turbo spp.) without encrust-
ing growth as a way of protecting immature shells from collection. Juvenile abalone 
live cryptically in the interstitial spaces within reefs, and as subadults they emerge to 
join adult feeding and breeding aggregations on the surface of the reef (Prince et al., 
1988). Maturity and timing of emergence from the cryptic juvenile habitat are prin-
cipally determined by age rather than size (Shepherd and Laws, 1974; McShane, 1991; 
Nash, 1992), and predictable changes in the shape and appearance of abalone shells 
coincide with these processes (Prince et al., 2008). Juvenile growth is primarily in 
shell length rather than weight. Before maturity, because juveniles remain wedged in 
dark interstitial reef spaces, little if any epibiota colonizes the surfaces of their shells. 
Thus juveniles and newly emerged maturing abalone can be recognized by shells that 
are flat, oval, and relatively clean of epibiotic growth. In subadults, linear growth 
slows while rapid growth in total weight continues. Shells both widen relative to their 
length and become relatively deeper, taking on an increasingly bowl-like shape (Fig. 
3). The result is an increase in both the ratio of width to length (Worthington et al., 
1995; Worthington and Andrew, 1998) and that of height to length (Saunders et al., 
2008). On the surface of the reef, as the abalone mature, their shells become covered 
with the epibiota typical of the reef as they approach their maximum potential SPR.
Rapid Visual Assessment of Abalone Reefs.—Recognizing the coincidence 
between emergence and sexual maturity in abalone and understanding how shell 
shape changes with maturity and emergent living provide a powerful, if somewhat 
crude, tool for gauging the status of abalone populations and developing reef-scale 
harvest policies (Fig. 3). Taken at its simplest, the RVA technique and the associated 
reef-scale harvest policies are concerned with identifying populations that consist 
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almost entirely of abalone with clean, flat, oval shells, which are predicted to have 
low SPR and to be at risk of growth and recruitment overfishing. The objective is to 
manage each population in a way that moves it toward consisting principally of in-
dividuals with rounded, domed, fouled shells, which, because they are approaching 
the asymptotic length of the population, are likely to have produced approximately 
50% SPR, a biological reference point recommended for abalone by Shepherd and 
Baker (1998), which should preserve conservative levels of reproductive capacity. 
This objective of RVA is still based on a relatively qualitative understanding of aba-
lone stock-recruitment relationships, growth, and morphology, but the approach is 
stimulating a body of research aimed at testing and refining the quantitative basis of 
the approach (e.g., Saunders et al., 2008; Saunders and Mayfield, 2008). In practice 
the objective of RVA gains strong support from the abalone divers in each new area 
to which it is introduced, because they benefit from a rapid gain in yield per recruit 
when management moves a reef from carrying mainly abalone with clean, flat, oval 
Figure 3. An illustration of the principles underlying the rapid visual assessment of abalone; aba-
lone with low fecundity are identified by their flat, oval shells, which tend to be free of encrusting 
growths, whereas fully mature abalone with high fecundity have deeper, rounder shells, which 
tend to be covered with encrusting growths similar to those on the reefs where they live. Repro-
duced from Prince et al. (2008).
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shells to one carrying large numbers of rounded, domed, fouled shells (Prince et al., 
2008).
By means of the principles of RVA, any abalone population can be assessed visually 
through the examination of shells or, more remotely, by extension through commer-
cial divers’ knowledge. Abalone shells from a reef can be sampled from commercial 
catches or inspected in situ and examined with regard to three primary metrics. 
First, the size of maturity and emergence can be ascertained from measurements of 
individuals with clean, flat shells. Next, the size of full maturity and approximately 
50% SPR can be gauged from measurements of individuals with rounded, bowl-like 
shells and surface fouling like that on the reef top. Third, the overall size distribution 
of the sample can be gauged relative to the size of first maturity, 50% SPR, and the 
legal minimum lengths. With the RVA technique, and the input of divers, 100s of ki-
lometers of abalone-carrying shoreline can be rapidly assessed over 5–10 d of inter-
views or during several days of reef-assessment workshops facilitated by the decision 
tree in Figure 4. Divers who depend on their powers of observation and memory of 
reefs to fish efficiently readily learn the shell features used to appraise reefs. We have 
also found that teaching the underlying principles to abalone divers is extremely ef-
fective in motivating them to engage with the process of reef-scale management.
The Reef Assessment Decision Tree.—The logic underpinning the process of 
RVA has been codified into a decision tree (Fig. 4) for use during reef-assessment 
workshops attended by quota owners and divers of a management zone. The use of 
the decision tree has facilitated discussions and made the decision-making process 
more transparent, thus increasing the communal support required for industry as-
sociations to initiate voluntary action at reef scales. The decision tree is used to place 
every reef into one of eight exploitation categories, each of which has an associated 
Figure 4. Decision tree for abalone used in reef-assessment workshops to apply rapid visual as-
sessment principles in the development of management plans for individual abalone reefs. Repro-
duced from Prince et al. (2008).
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preagreed harvest policy. The primary indicators used to assess the reefs are reef-
scale effort and catch trends over the previous 5–15 yrs and the appearance of the 
abalone shells either on the reef or in the catch. In practice, sufficiently fine-scale ef-
fort and catch data are not always available, but we have found that groups of divers 
can reliably provide qualitative reports on whether effort and catch trends on a reef 
have been rising, falling, or stable. The first two levels of decision are based entirely 
on effort or catch trends (Fig. 4). First, trends are identified as either unstable or 
stable. At the second level, stable trends are classified as either comparatively low or 
comparatively high, and unstable trends as declining or rising. Shell appearance is 
then used to distinguish population status further (Fig. 4).
Development of the Reef Assessment Process.—The reef assessment work-
shops began in 2002, when first the Western Abalone Divers Association (WADA, 
the industry association for the Victorian Western Zone) and then in 2004 the in-
dustry association (VADA) of the adjacent Central Zone engaged an “external change 
agent” to develop with them the basic methodology and then initiated a process of 
reef assessment and management using the decision tree described above (Prince et 
al., 2008). The associations now hold two reef-assessment workshops each year to 
assess data from the previously finished year and to reassess reefs and prepare reef-
scale harvesting plans. The associations use the workshops to agree on voluntary size 
limits and catch levels for each reef so that the total allowable catch is distributed op-
timally around their zone rather than focused on particular reefs. To help facilitate 
the associations’ self-management processes, Fisheries Victoria has adapted their 
quota-reporting system so that it operates in real time. As divers land and weigh 
their daily catches, they use mobile telephones to report the weight from each reef 
to an automated system. The progressive catch total for each reef then becomes im-
mediately available on a Fisheries Victoria website. Divers and the executive office 
of the industry associations can track progressive daily catches to guide selection of 
future diving locations. The executive officers consult their executive committees 
when voluntary catch caps are reached on any reef, and divers are notified by e-mail 
and telephone when the associations voluntarily close reefs.
In recent years both WADA and VADA have concluded that zonal assessment 
models are overoptimistic and have requested, and been given, TACCs 24% and 19%, 
respectively, lower than those supported by the zonal models. Both zones have used 
the catch reductions to implement temporary closures or substantially lower catches 
from specific reefs that their reef-assessment processes have identified as being of 
most concern.
In July 2005, Australia’s federal government principal fisheries R&D fund granted 
four years of funding for continuing reef-assessment workshops with WADA and 
VADA and extended them to three additional zonal abalone associations: the final 
zone of Victoria, the New South Wales industry association, and the South Austra-
lian Central Zone association. Almost all the other regional abalone industry as-
sociations across Australia have also expressed interest in applying the approach. 
Because the approach is still based on a largely qualitative understanding of abalone 
fisheries biology, several quantitative studies have also been supported by funding 
bodies with the aim of testing and refining it. To date the results of these studies 
confirm the basic validity and effectiveness of the approach (Saunders et al., 2008; 
Saunders and Mayfield, 2008). Before this quantitative confirmation of the approach, 
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the support of collaborating agency scientists and managers had still been growing 
because of the increased understanding they themselves had developed through the 
reef-assessment workshops. The access to the detailed spatial knowledge of the divers 
afforded by the workshops has enabled them to understand the resource more clearly 
and to become more confident of local assessment and management outcomes than 
they are of the regional quantitative assessments. On the strength of the broad in-
dustry interest in the approach, Australia’s main funding body has indicated that it 
is prepared to continue funding the development and extension of the approach over 
decade-long time frames and has requested assistance in incorporating the approach 
into its broader R&D strategy.
By engaging industry directly, this approach to assessing and managing a spatially 
complex fishery is starting to overcome limitations on data collection. Invariably as 
new industry groups engage with the principles underlying the RVA of reefs and be-
gin making decisions at the scale of reefs based on whatever data are available, they 
become increasingly interested in gathering better spatially explicit catch and size 
information for themselves. Generally, each group starts deeply antagonistic to col-
lecting spatially explicit data because of their natural resistance to close monitoring, 
but in the course of the process, they become increasingly supportive of gathering 
data for their own use and move to initiate data-gathering programs. This growing 
interest has promoted development and deployment of technologies that incorporate 
global positioning systems into collection of spatially explicit size, catch, and effort 
data. In the Western Zone of Victoria, WADA is now collecting a GPS position, time 
stamp, and size for every abalone taken, and VADA, one of whose members devel-
oped the measuring machine, began deploying the machines in 2002 on a voluntary 
basis with a subset of divers and collected its millionth measurement in 2007. To 
support this voluntary program, VADA gives a carton of beer to divers and their 
deckhands in return for every 10,000 data records.
In its current form, the abalone decision tree and the RVA of an abalone reef are 
basically qualitative or semiquantitative at best. Some might argue that a more quan-
titative approach is preferable and ask about species that do not present the handy 
visual markers used for abalone. Where the fishers can be engaged in collecting size, 
catch, and effort data, relatively simple assessment-decision trees can be constructed 
to adjust local catches incrementally until local targets based on SPR and relative 
abundance are achieved (Campbell et al., 2007). Multiple assessments of this nature 
across a metapopulation could provide the basis of a scale-less stock assessment and 
inform local fishing communities about the exploitation rates being experienced by 
local resources.
Conclusions
Recognition is growing that fine-scale spatially complex fisheries resources present 
a particular challenge to the centralized top-down model of assessment and manage-
ment (Berkes et al., 2001; Johannes, 2003; Hilborn et al., 2004; Orensanz et al., 2005; 
Prince, 2005). A tyranny of scale results from the implicit scale and cost of the top-
down processes of central government, which cannot be simply resized to address 
the complexity, small scale, low unit value, and overwhelming number of compo-
nent populations that comprise these resources (Prince, 2003a, 2005). Recognizing 
the misfit between institutional and ecological scales is a necessary first step toward 
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addressing this issue, but the solution involves redesigning our model for data col-
lection, assessment, and management (Berkes et al., 2001; Prince, 2003a, 2005). Ex-
amination of the literature on this topic reveals that international experience with 
alternative management systems has produced a convergence of thinking about the 
solutions to this issue. Central to the solution are governance systems that confer se-
cure exclusive access rights on fishers (Johannes, 1982, 1984; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom 
et al., 1999; Berkes et al., 2001; Charles, 2001; Dietz et al., 2003; Hilborn et al., 2004; 
Orensanz et al., 2005) and therefore give them strong incentives to exercise steward-
ship over their resources and to engage with processes of data collection, assessment, 
and management, commonly thought of as the responsibility of central government 
(Berkes et al., 2001; Prince, 2003a; Orensanz et al., 2005). Spatially explicit forms of 
access rights such as TURFs seem particularly apposite for fostering stewardship of 
small spatially complex fisheries.
Here, I have argued that the next part of the solution is to recognize that the 
needs of small-scale spatially complex fish stocks are generic and that a generic ap-
proach should be developed for local adaptation to each resource. The generic ap-
proach proposed revolves around the use of barefoot ecologists, extension workers 
or change agents trained to work with both the social and biological dimensions of 
each resource to create social capital and empower local fishers to collect data and 
to make their own assessments and management plans. To accomplish these tasks, 
barefoot ecologists must be equipped with a generic set of skills and a toolbox. An 
essential skill is the collection and use of fisher knowledge, as exemplified by the 
body of Johannes’s work cited above. This skill, together with a level of ecological 
“common sense” can provide the basis for both an initial assessment of a resource 
and the design of simple data-collection and decision-making systems. Incorporat-
ing Johannes’s (1998b) ideas for dataless management and Orensanz et al.’s (2005) 
recommendation to use simple data-driven decision rules, I recommend adopting 
the default assumption that recruitment is localized until proven otherwise and de-
signing simple harvest strategies and decision rules based on conserving local levels 
of spawning biomass.
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